Leadoff Base Runners: A statistical conclusion

The Red Sox managed to have 6 innings where the leadoff man reached base in the game against Kansas City. Half of the time the lead off man made it to second base. I began to wonder how much of a difference does it make when the leadoff man reaches? I found a study that looked at all of the games in 1998 and focused on the same question.

When the leadoff man in an inning reaches there is roughly a 40% chance that he will go on to score. Why do the odds shift in his favor so dramatically? Simply put the team increases the number of tools available to generate a run. For example, they can bunt to move the base runner over or they can use a sacrifice fly. They can use any number of strategies since they now have three outs to work with to manufacture a run.

There are always discussions about what type of player should be the leadoff batter. Should he be patient at the plate, like Youkilis, and eventually draw a walk? Should he be a good hitter, like Crisp, and get on with a lot of singles? Should he be fast, like Lugo, and use his speed to distract the pitcher when the next batter gets to the plate (this is only effective if Lugo gets on in the first place)?

As it happens, a closer look at the data suggests that it doesn’t matter how the leadoff man gets to the plate. There is a slight edge when a man reaches on an error, but it’s safe to assume the opposing team might be having an off night if they are creating an error in the first place, so that small difference can easily be accounted for.

Reached- Scored- %
Single 7066 - 2850 - 40.3

Walk 3297 - 1344 - 40.8

Hit by pitch 332 - 134 - 40.4

Errors (to 1b) 340 - 145 - 42.6

Total 11035 - 4473 - 40.5

Source: Retrosheet, Inc.

Given all of this data, the game against Kansas City, where all eyes were focused on Dice-K’s debut, had a stunning statistical outcome that should not be overlooked. In the first inning there was no leadoff man yet the Red Sox managed to score. In the next six innings the Red Sox managed to get a leadoff man on base. Three of those innings the leadoff man made it all the way to second base. Knowing that even getting to first base results in a 40% chance of scoring, it’s easy to see how many people would expect the Red Sox to have scored many runs as a part of the six golden opportunities gained.

Surprisingly, the Red Sox were only able to take advantage of their leadoff man being on twice. Both times they capitalized on subsequent errors made by the Royals (a throwing error and a wild pitch) once the leadoff man was on. In retrospect, most people don’t spend time on the inner workings of how a game played out… unless the Red Sox lose that is. In this case, we should all be wondering, how could a team have missed out on so many golden opportunities? If the Red Sox don’t find a way to bring their leadoff men home there will be plenty of time to analyze the game because the chances of getting a leadoff man on followed by an error that allows him to score are as low as Kansas City winning the World Series this year.

Written by Diane Garnick